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The influx of Chinese into Malaysia in particular and “Central Southeast 
Asia” more generally is often popularly attributed to colonial rule, as if the 
pluralism they exemplified were not “natural” to the region. In reality, the 
Peninsula has always been highly plural, and the advance of the Chinese 
mining frontier within it preceded the British.1 This essay documents some 
of the means by which Chinese mining advanced the economic frontiers in 
Southeast Asia ahead of European capital. Tin, being the most obvious ex-
ample, takes center stage in this story.
early controversies
How metals technology spread in Southeast Asia in the earliest periods is 
a matter of considerable and long-standing debate, particularly since the 
Ban Chiang excavations in Thailand in the 1970s raised the possibility that 
bronze-working there may have been as old as that in China. The earliest 
Ban Chiang periodizations have now been largely discredited, however, and 
a consensus is emerging that the Southeast Asian bronze age began in the 
middle of the second century B.c.e., that it was distinct from any of the 
older “Chinese” traditions, yet somehow related to them, and that it long 
pre-dated the rise of states in Southeast Asia. Gold, iron, copper, and tin 
were undoubtedly mined, smelted, and worked into ornaments, utensils, 
and weapons in Southeast Asia before the Common Era (c.e.), and Chinese 
records of contact with Lao peoples at the end of the sixth century c.e. de-
clare that they made their own bronze drums in a manner different from the 
Chinese. We know little, however, about how the relevant technologies were 
disseminated or developed.2
 Until the era of bulk imports in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
iron and copper remained relatively scarce in island Southeast Asia, and trav-
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elers from Europe and China found that their everyday nails, knives, and 
needles were in great demand from the locals. The reasons appear to have 
been not so much the lack of minerals in the ground (although Java and Bali 
were particularly disadvantaged in that regard) as the sparse population (by 
Chinese standards) in the vicinity of most of these minerals, and conse-
quently smaller scale, less efficient methods of both mining and smelting.
 As trade developed in the second millennium of the Common Era, every-
day metal items became cheaper to import from afar than to produce locally. 
In Sung times, iron and ironware were “among the commonest commodi-
ties” exported to Southeast Asia from China.3 By 1500, the needs of South-
east Asian maritime centers like Melaka were provided principally from 
China, including “copper, iron . . . cast iron kettles, bowls, basins . . . plenty 
of needles of a hundred different kinds, some of them very fine and well 
made . . . and things of very poor quality like those that come to Portugal 
from Flanders.”4 These items could be produced far more cheaply in China 
than in any of the Southeast Asian cities because of more advanced min-
ing and smelting methods, so that Southeast Asian mining and metalwork 
tended to retreat with time to less accessible areas in the interior.
was There a chinese role in Borneo ironworking?
Iron is found in the northerly areas of the mainland states, and in the hills 
between Siam and Burma, as well as in the islands in central Sumatra, Beli-
tung, western Borneo, and central Sulawesi. Weapons, tools, and plough-
tips manufactured in these places had to circulate to many other populous 
centers, such as Java and Bali, where iron was not found.
 The ready availability of brown iron ores near the surface in many parts 
of western Borneo, and the islands of Belitung and Karimata off its shores, 
make this region particularly interesting. The ironworking site at the mouth 
of the Sarawak River was somewhat controversially investigated by Tom Har-
rison in the 1960s. He and Stanley O’Connor claimed as many as 40,000 tons 
of slag were left behind in three adjacent sites where iron was extracted from 
ores between around 900 and 1350. The technology for smelting the iron was 
not of Chinese type, with a fixed furnace, but rather by using open charcoal 
fires in bowl-like recessions in the ground. This relatively simple technology 
was still in use in the nineteenth century among peoples of interior Borneo 
such as the Kayan and Kenyah, whom imported iron was the last to reach.5 
Karl Hutterer also found large amounts of slag in Cebu that he dated to iron-
smelting processes of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.6
 Both sites were relatively accessible to the China trade. In particular, West 
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Borneo was on the standard sailing routes between south China and the 
Majapahit heartland of Java. While discounting Chinese technological influ-
ences on ironworking in Borneo, Harrison and O’Connor argue that Sarawak 
iron may have been carried to China by Arab and other ships, since too much 
was being produced for local consumption. Wheatley had already argued 
that wi-mung-i, which was listed in the Sung chronicle as being brought to 
China by Arab merchants, was probably “the hydrated iron oxide known as 
limonite.”7
 Around 1600, a time for which evidence of the internal Southeast Asia 
trade is more abundant, the most important archipelago center for exporting 
parangs and other iron tools was Karimata, about 60 kilometers off the coast 
of Southwest Borneo. Java and Makasar imported their axes and parangs 
from Karimata, while Malays of the Peninsula were said to carry krisses of 
Karimata steel. When the Dutch found a way to access this supply, in 1630, 
they purchased almost 10,000 axes and parangs in one lot.8 Although Beli-
tung was also a source for this kind of trade, with “more parangs but fewer 
axes,” the reputation of tiny Karimata for superior workmanship was such 
that the label “Karimata” was applied more widely.9
 So centrally were the Karimata islands located on the sailing routes be-
tween China and Java that the major strait on that route was named the Kari-
mata Strait, between those islands and Belitung. Whatever the case in the 
Sarawak River area, there is firm evidence in Karimata of Chinese craftsmen 
settling as early as the thirteenth century. Wang Dayuan, describing the Nan-
yang a half-century after the Mongol fleet set off to conquer Java in 1293, had 
this to say of an island he called Goulan Shan.
When the [Yuan] dynasty was founded, the forces to attack Java were 
driven by the wind to this island, and the ships wrecked. One ship fortu-
nately escaped with stores of nails and mortar. Seeing that there was a 
great deal of timber on this island, they built some tens of ships, every-
thing from ribs to sails and bamboo poles were supplied [from the 
island]. Over a hundred men who were ill from the long beating about in 
the storm and were unable to leave were left on the island, and today the 
Chinese live mixed up with the native families.10
 Rockhill sought to identify this mysterious island with the tiny island 
of Gelam off the coast of Southwest Borneo, though the Karimata group 
seem more likely in view of their location on the sailing routes. Whether or 
not this group of Chinese transferred smelting technology to Karimata and 
Belitung, there were many other Chinese craftsmen who passed this way in 
Tseng 2010.10.25 09:11 8741 Tagliacozzo • Chinese Circulations • Sheet 36 of 524 Tseng 2010.10.25 09:11 8741 Tagliacozzo • Chinese Circulations • Sheet 37 of 524
P R O O F
24 anThony reid
Ming times, some of whom may also have been shipwrecked or defected vol-
untarily. As Zhou Daguan put it of Angkor in the 1290s, since “women are 
easily had . . . a great many sailors desert to take up permanent residence.”11
 Whatever technology transfer there may have been to iron-production in 
this Karimata-Belitung area cannot have been continuous. The gap between 
economies of scale in production in China and in the archipelago grew wider 
with more frequent shipping in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth 
century, cheaper imported Chinese iron- and metalwork drove out most of 
the production in accessible coastal areas of the archipelago. The dwindling 
community of ironworkers of Karimata left for the mainland in 1808.12
chinese expansion of the mining frontier in the eighteenth century
In the eighteenth century, China’s population grew markedly, stimulating 
an increase in the demand for silver, gold, copper, and lead as currency to 
fuel the expanding economy. The quest for minerals was one factor propel-
ling Chinese explorers, miners, traders, and officials south and west, even-
tually bringing the empire’s extent to its historic maximum. Yunnan was the 
largest mining frontier for Chinese, with 300,000 Han miners reportedly 
working there in 1750 and 500,000 in 1800.13 Sources of silver, lead, and 
zinc were particularly abundant around what is today the boundary between 
southern Yunnan and Burma’s Shan state. The massive Munai and Maolong 
mines peaked in production in the mid-eighteenth century, and eventually 
came under permanent Qing control.14 Chinese miners went beyond im-
perial control, into the hills in the north of Dai Viet and what is today Bur-
mese and Lao territory.
 The huge Bawdwin opencast mine in Shan territory was the most impor-
tant Chinese-worked mine of the border area that never fell under Qing con-
trol. It may have been “protected” from this fate by malaria, which Herbert 
Hoover contracted when inspecting the mine for its modern rebirth in the 
British period. Ming records suggest that it was Chinese miners who first 
brought the mine into production in 1412, and they continued to extract sil-
ver from it in increasing amounts throughout the eighteenth century.
 Copper, lead, and silver also occur in the northern border area of northern 
Vietnam, where geographical barriers to an influx of Chinese miners were 
less intimidating, but political ones were better established along one of 
Asia’s oldest frontiers. Here, too, the eighteenth century was the peak period 
for the expansion of Chinese mining. The Trinh regime that governed north-
ern Vietnam (Tonkin) profited greatly from the booming output of the mines 
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and in the 1760s was reportedly drawing half its revenue from levies on these 
northern mines. By midcentury, there were upward of 20,000 Cantonese at 
the Tong-tinh copper mines alone, despite a series of royal decrees seeking 
to limit their numbers. In the second half of the century, the copper-mining 
operation in the border areas was thought to have averaged over 500 tons 
output per annum, making it one of the largest in Asia. The tenuous control 
the court exercised over the Chinese mining kongsis caused increasing diffi-
culties, however, and in 1767 the Trinh attempted to expel them from Viet-
nam. The economic stakes were too high, however, and the attempt failed.15
gold-working
Precious metals were the most ancient and valued of Southeast Asia’s pre-
cious minerals, particularly the silver of the northern mainland close to Yun-
nan, and the gold of Sumatra, Borneo, and the Peninsula. Chinese miners 
were also attracted to these commodities, although they never became as 
dominant as they were on the nineteenth-century tin fields. Sumatran gold, 
which gave rise to the Sanskrit soubriquet Suvarna-bhumi (gold-land), was 
for the most part off limits to Chinese miners. It was considered so precious 
an item of royal monopoly that outsiders were discouraged. William Dam-
pier related that in Aceh in the 1680s, when gold had become the principal 
export of the state, only Muslims were permitted to go to the rich mining 
areas of Kawaj XIII in the hills behind Pidië. Huge profits were reportedly 
made in these gold fields, discovered only about thirty years earlier, and the 
wealth they produced brought Chinese traders and craftsmen to the Aceh 
capital every year. However, to prevent them reaching the goldfields, armed 
guards were posted along the route.16
 Central Southeast Asia—western Borneo, eastern Sumatra and its 
islands, and the Peninsula—with its sparse populations and states largely 
dependent on the economic activities of outsiders, was the major Southeast 
Asian theater of Chinese mining. Gold had been extracted from Borneo and 
the Peninsula for more than a millennium, by simple methods of panning. 
However, as with tin, the larger-scale labor organization of Cantonese and 
Hakka miners was introduced to archipelago gold-mining in the middle of 
the eighteenth century. In most cases, river-mouth chiefs and rajas engaged 
them to work more efficiently interior mineral resources hitherto dependent 
on the part-time attention of agriculturalists.
 One such early settlement on the Peninsula was Pulai, in upper Kelantan, 
which Hakka gold-miners had opened by the second half of the eighteenth 
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century.17 Graham, however, suggests it was considerably older, and that in 
earlier times “the mineral products of Kelantan considerably exceeded in 
value those of any other State” in the Peninsula.18 During the reign of Sultan 
Mahmat in Kelantan (1807–1837), the ruler’s son was killed by the previously 
self-governing Chinese miners when he tried to enforce his newly granted 
monopoly of rice distribution by cutting off the mining settlement from all 
supplies coming up the river to them. The dead prince’s son then organized 
a massacre of the whole Chinese settlement, “and the gold mining industry 
of Kelantan came to a sudden end.”19
 But it was the goldfields north of the Kapuas River in West Borneo that 
drew the largest number of Chinese pioneers. As early as 1740, the ruler of 
Mempawah, or in some accounts the Sultan of Sambas, decided to bring 
Chinese miners in to work the gold-bearing rivers he sought to control. 
Production had previously depended on the part-time labor of Dayaks. The 
Malay rulers used terms that had been effective on a small scale with the 
Dayaks, providing salt, rice, opium, and cloth at inflated monopoly prices in 
return for a monopoly of the gold extracted. In addition, the Chinese as out-
siders were forbidden to engage in agriculture (to increase their dependence 
on the ruler’s supplies) and were charged a head tax on entering or leaving 
Borneo through the ruler’s port.20
 The Chinese miners set to work initially on mines abandoned by the 
Dayaks, but used more intense and mechanized methods to sluice away the 
topsoil above the gold-bearing lode. They were also much more centrally 
organized through their kongsi, a ritual brotherhood in which capital and 
labor were shared in acknowledged portions.21 Gradually the kongsis be-
came autonomous by forming their own relations with interior Dayaks (in-
cluding marriage), farming the surrounding land, and smuggling their gold 
out through channels not controlled by the rulers. The capitalists who estab-
lished the mine and funded the importation of workers of course had the 
largest share, and laborers still indebted for their passage had none, but 
older workers did share decision-making and often rotated the leadership 
among themselves.
 There is no way to know the amount of gold shipped out, chiefly to China, 
but the fact that about 60,000 Chinese miners were at work there over about 
a century indicates that it must have been extremely large. As Dutch power 
advanced in the nineteenth century, most of the kongsis made their peace 
with it through a system of indirect rule, but the strongest Montrado kongsi 
remained defiant until conquered in the 1850s.
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The chinese Tin-mining frontier
A large proportion of the world’s tin is concentrated in the chain of hills 
from eastern Burma in the north down through the Malayan Peninsula to 
the islands of Bangka and Belitung in the south. By the tenth century, the 
Peninsula was supplying most of Asia’s tin needs. The trade boom of 1580–
1640 witnessed a great increase in mining of this tin to supply the busy mar-
kets of India, China, Siam, and Java. Up until the seventeenth century, it 
was the ports of the western coast of the Peninsula—Junk Ceylon (Phuket), 
Perak, and Selangor—that supplied India, while Ligor (Nakhonsithamma-
rat), Pahang, and other ports on the eastern coast supplied most of China’s 
needs.
 The miners appear to have been long-term Peninsula residents of various 
ethnicities, who attended to mining when the demands of rice growing or 
serving their rulers’ requirements permitted. Mining sites were located and 
supervised by a pawang (shaman) who could mediate with the spirit of the 
tin. Men dug the ore and earth out of flooded pits, while women separated 
the tin ore with their fingers.22 The method was first described in Perak by 
Eredia: “The earth is dug out of the mountains and placed on certain tables 
where the earth is dispersed by water in such a way that only the tin in the 
form of grains remains on the tables. It is then melted in certain clay moulds 
and by a process of casting is converted into . . . slabs.”23 The “casting” was 
a primitive form of smelting in which burning charcoal was mixed with the 
tin ore until the metal ran out into the mold. These slabs, of about twenty 
kilograms, were then floated down the rivers to port, where the port-ruler 
usually took the largest share of the profits of selling it.
 Around 1500, the port-sultanate of Melaka controlled most of the tin 
of what is today Kedah, Perak, and Selangor, and sold most of it to pass-
ing Indian merchants to take back to their own South Asian markets. The 
amounts, however, appear to have been small. Pires gives figures for the tin 
rendered to Melaka as tribute by all the west-coast ports, which amounts to 
only 34 tons (36,000 calain), worth 1,000 cruzados.24 Estimates of total ex-
ports around 1600 vary between 100–300 tons, mostly from Perak and Phu-
ket. The largest estimate at the peak of the trade boom is a Dutch one of 
1638, to be taken with caution, that Perak and Kedah could each produce up 
to 1,000 tons (6,000 bahar) a year.25
 The Portuguese occupants of Melaka (1511–1641) had to contest the 
supply of tin with Muslim traders, and they lost out completely after their 
Tseng 2010.10.25 09:11 8741 Tagliacozzo • Chinese Circulations • Sheet 40 of 524 Tseng 2010.10.25 09:11 8741 Tagliacozzo • Chinese Circulations • Sheet 41 of 524
P R O O F
28 anThony reid
great Muslim enemy Aceh conquered the Perak and Kedah fields in 1575. The 
Dutch, who in turn conquered Melaka in 1641, hoped to use the port to mo-
nopolize the supply of tin, and they were in a much stronger position to do 
so. The largest amount they ever succeeded in acquiring, however, was 380 
tons, in 1650, and the effect of their heavy–handed “system of fixed prices, 
annual quotas and exclusive privileges” appears only to have been to drive 
the tin industry of the Peninsula into decline in the second half of the cen-
tury.26
 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Voc) attempts to force the purchase 
of tin at unrealistically low prices from the Malay states it could control from 
Melaka drove the chief centers of production northward into Siamese and 
Burmese territory, so that Phuket (Junk Ceylon), Takuapa, and Tavoy were 
supplying much of the market in the early eighteenth century. Chulia (south 
Indian), Bugis, Chinese, and Eng lish traders paid higher prices and took the 
bulk of the supply.27 The quantities remained modest (probably below 1,000 
tons in total), however, until the systematic exploitation of tin discoveries 
on Bangka by Chinese miners in the middle of the century. China’s demand 
for Southeast Asian tin expanded greatly during its prosperous eighteenth 
century, partly to make the tinfoil burnt as joss paper in offerings to the an-
cestors, but also for packaging the booming tea trade.28
 The tin of Bangka was discovered around 1710 by Muslim Sino-Malays 
familiar with mines on the Peninsula. It came to the notice of Batavia in 
1717, when a pretender to the Palembang throne in exile in Bangka offered 
some to the Dutch in an attempt to gain their support. In 1722, the Voc 
signed a contract with the sultan of Palembang for the delivery of all Bangka 
tin, and in the years 1723–1730 deliveries averaged 175 tons a year. Produc-
tion continued at this modest level by traditional Southeast Asian methods 
until about 1750, when a Chinese known in Bangka tradition as Un Asing 
began systematically importing Chinese contract workers from Guangdong 
with their sophisticated sluicing techniques. Production increased rapidly, 
so that deliveries to the Voc averaged 1,037 tons a year in the 1750s and 
1,562 tons in the 1760s.29 Although the level of reported deliveries to the 
Voc dropped a little thereafter, the reason appears to have been that larger 
proportions of Bangka tin were evading Dutch control and being bought by 
Eng lish, Chinese, and other traders at independent ports such as Riau. Euro-
pean ships alone sold 1,611 tons of Southeast Asian (chiefly Bangka) tin in 
Canton in 1768 and an average of 2,162 tons a year in 1771–1774.30 Presum-
ing that an equal amount was being imported to China by Chinese vessels 
or being taken by Indian and Southeast Asian consumers, Southeast Asia’s 
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tin production must have rivaled Cornwall’s by the 1770s. Europe, however, 
was slow to realize the remarkable growth of this threat from the East.
 Although some of the Chinese miners of Bangka were reported in a Malay 
history to have been brought from Siam and Vietnam, and links with the 
gold-miners of Borneo cannot be ruled out, most were certainly brought in 
directly from Canton through an exclusively Chinese network.
Annually . . . a confidential and competent Chinese agent [went] by the 
junk returning from Palembang to China, to invite efficient and select 
men. . . . The expenses of their voyage and establishment was to be de-
frayed by the [local capitalist] who was to be reimbursed from their first 
profits at the mines. . . . Until they had liquidated the obligations they 
thus incurred . . . they were not permitted to relinquish the labours of 
the mines.31
 There were probably over 6,000 Chinese miners there by the 1770s, chiefly 
Hakkas from the Meixian area of Guangdong. They were organized in teams 
(kongsi, pinyin gongsi) of about thirty men responsible to a headman repre-
senting the authority of the tikos (pinyin dage, elder brother), usually a Sino-
Malay trader living in Palembang and providing the capital needed to open 
the mine and import the labor. The kongsis were relatively egalitarian: “The 
whole of the labourers work on terms of equality . . . while all share equally 
in the profits.”32
 The larger units of labor and capital, as well as techniques brought from 
China, made possible a much higher level of technology in both mining and 
smelting the tin. The Chinese used a chain-pallet pump common in Chinese 
irrigation to clear pits of 6–10 meters depth, and to wash the soil from the 
ore. In smelting, they introduced a superior furnace and bellows, with spe-
cialist teams of six or more men producing a high standard of purity that 
gave “Bangka tin” an unrivaled reputation worldwide.33
 Bangka production declined in the 1790s because of the usual problem of 
insecurity. On the one hand, the essential function of the tikos in mediating 
between the Palembang court and Chinese miners broke down as Palembang 
aristocrats attempted to dominate the industry. On the other, Illanun and 
Malay marauders began raiding the island for tin and slaves, reducing min-
ing communities to ruin and driving the surviving Chinese away. Production 
began to rise again when the British occupied Bangka, in 1812, and the re-
stored Dutch in 1816 decided to rule the island directly. Although the miners 
and smelters remained Chinese, the autonomy of the kongsis was gradually 
replaced by a greater degree of Dutch control, even in the recruitment of 
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labor from Canton. Tin production recovered rapidly, from 1,250 tons a year 
around 1820 to 3,000 tons in the 1830s.34,In addition, the production of the 
various centers on the Peninsula totaled 2,000 tons in 1835, according to a 
careful survey by P. J. Begbie.35 Most of these centers, too, were worked by 
Chinese, with Sungei Ujong (around modern Seremban), Perak, and Treng-
ganu the most productive.36
 In the nineteenth century, industrial Europe and America surged ahead 
of Asia as importers of tin. Straits Settlements tin exports in the 1840s had 
been distributed between India (39 percent), China (10 percent), Europe (34 
percent) and the United States (9 percent). By 1869–1873, the proportions 
had shifted to India 9 percent; China 18 percent, Europe 43 percent, and the 
United States 28 percent.37 The reason for the shift was the manufacture of 
tin plate, in which rapid technical advances had been made throughout the 
century. Tin consumption in Britain grew from a thousand tons a year in the 
first decade of the century to 2,600 in the 1820s and 5,800 in the 1840s. From 
being the world’s major exporter of tin, Britain became a net importer in the 
1850s. Europe as a whole became a major importer of the tin first of Bangka 
and then of the Malayan Peninsula (see table 1).
 Chinese mining gradually wrought the same transformation on the 
rich Peninsula tin fields as it had in Bangka, though with many initial set-
backs due to the lack of security. Chinese had been involved in leasing the 
tin fields of Phuket from the Siamese king early in the eighteenth century, 
and were smelting there while Malays and Thais dug for the tin. Ambitious 
Malay rulers must periodically have introduced Chinese to boost the existing 
Malay production elsewhere in the Peninsula. The Sultan of Perak adopted 
a Dutch suggestion in the 1770s that he emulate the favorable Bangka ex-
perience by employing Chinese miners, finding some for the task in Dutch 
Melaka. The ruler of Selangor brought Chinese miners into Lukut around 
1815, and there were more than 300 there by 1834, when fighting broke out 
and caused a collapse. The Penghulu of Sungei Ujong (now in Negri Sembi-
lan) established 600 Chinese miners on the Linggi River in 1828, making use 
of a large advance from Melaka merchants to whom the tin was consigned. 
But after a conflict over a local woman in 1830, “great numbers” of the Chi-
nese were slaughtered and the remainder fled, their property seized by the 
local chiefs.38 In Perak, Chinese miners had begun work by 1818. Each time 
violence broke out, new miners were induced to return a few years later.39
 The uneasy cooperation between Malay rulers, Chinese financiers from 
the Straits Settlements, Chinese smelters, and a mixture of Malay and Chi-
nese miners opened up the forested peninsula and attracted a variety of mi-
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grants to it. Wong Lin Ken instances the system operated by the Dato Klana 
of Sungei Ujong in the 1820s. He received an advance of $2,500 every month 
from Chinese financiers in Melaka, in return for directing the tin output to 
them. The Dato provided supplies and opium to the Chinese kongsis that 
worked each mine, and also levied a monthly rent from them. He required 
each bangsal (shed) to provide him three bahar (540 kg) of tin at a favorable 
fixed price, which he then sold to the Melaka merchants.40
 In the 1840s, production expanded rapidly in response to the increasing 
demand for and price of tin in Europe. New ore deposits were discovered in 
Lukut (in today’s Negri Sembilan), along the Klang River in Selangor (in-
cluding the area of modern Kuala Lumpur), at Kanching on the Selangor 
River, and above all at Larut in the Taiping area of Perak, where there were 
5,000 Chinese miners working in 1861. Older workings in Melaka itself, in 
nearby Sungei Ujong, and in Phuket (southern Siam) were worked much 
more rigorously by Chinese miners than had been the case with the mixed 
and part-time labor of earlier periods. Phuket, where the ancient mines had 
been left to languish during the wars of the late eighteenth century and early 
nineteenth, revived spectacularly, to the point where Bradley claimed it had 
a population of 25,000 Chinese (and fewer than a thousand others) in 1870, 
table 1 european imports of Southeast asian Tin, in Tons p.a.
Total tin sold 
in Europe 
market
Imported from 
Southeast  
Asia (%)
Imported 
from 
Bangka (%)
Imported 
from the 
Peninsula (%)
1831–35  6,185 1,804 (29) 787 (12.7) 1,017 (16.4)
1836–40  7,704 2,403 (31) 1,575 (20.4) 829 (10.8)
1841–45  9,992 3,294 (33) 2,452 (24.5) 842 (8.4)
1846–50 11,793 4,875 (41) 4,066 (34.5) 809 (6.9)
1851–55 11,789 5,507 (47) 4,207 (35.7) 1,300 (11.0)
1856–60 14,647 7,773 (53) 5,978 (40.8) 1,786 (12.2)
1861–65 17,537 7,856 (45) 4,579 (26.1) 3,277 (18.7)
1866–70 18,277 8,515 (47) 4,956 (27.1) 3,559 (19.5)
1871–75 23,134 10,606 (46) 4,755 (20.6) 5,851 (25.3)
Source: Calculated from Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914 (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1964), 14.
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producing 3,600 tons of tin per year.41 As before, it was Chinese merchants 
in the Straits Settlements who provided the capital and initiative for this 
expansion, and who persevered in finding laborers for the booming mines 
even when political instability and periodic massacres drove the original 
miners out.42
 Straits Settlements exports of Peninsula tin reached 2,446 tons per 
annum in 1844–1848, 3,750 tons per annum a decade later, and 7,919 tons 
per annum in 1864–1869, more than tripling in twenty years.43 Bangka pro-
duction grew much more slowly, and was overtaken by the Peninsula in the 
1870s. For Penang, trade grew in the decade after 1851 “at a greater rate than 
at any other period of her history,” largely because it was a base for the tin of 
Perak and of Phuket.44 The value of Pinang’s trade with Siam and the Penin-
sula, fueled overwhelmingly by tin, rose more than tenfold in each case (see 
table 2).
 In the years after 1873, Britain was drawn to intervene in the crucial tin-
producing states—Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang—largely 
by pressure from Straits merchants, Chinese and European, to end the cha-
otic instability that hindered commerce there. In the years after British con-
trol, Malayan tin production continued to increase rapidly, until 1895, as 
did Bangka more slowly, though stabilizing or even stagnating thereafter.45 
In 1879, Malaya surpassed Cornwall and Australia to become the world’s 
largest tin producer, and soon thereafter produced more than the rest of the 
world combined, a position that Southeast Asian producers retain today. 
Throughout that period of expansion, Chinese dominated the Malayan tin 
trade, whether in terms of capital, labor, or technology. Peaceful conditions 
table 2 Value of Penang Trade with Siam and 
the Peninsula, in Thousands of Straits dollars
Siam Peninsula
1845 345 69
1854 n.a. 572
1864 2,293 1,466
1872 5,669 4,120
Source: Anthony Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra: 
Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain 1858–1898 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), 294.
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and the beginnings of transport infrastructure helped after British inter-
vention, but the pace of expansion on the Chinese mining frontier had been 
as great or greater during the thirty years before British intervention created 
those conditions.
 The frontier levied a terrible toll on these Chinese miners. Tens of thou-
sands arrived every year to work in the mines, and a substantial proportion of 
them died every year there. Many succumbed to the internal conflicts of the 
1830s through the 1860s, initially at Malay hands but later overwhelmingly 
through secret-society conflicts, whereby the Cantonese of the so-called five 
districts were mobilized by the Hai San society, and those of the “four dis-
tricts” by the Ghee Hin or Triad. Many more died of diseases, including ma-
laria, cholera, and dysentery. Figures are not available until the late 1870s, 
by which time the ravages of beriberi made the Perak tin fields among the 
most lethal frontiers anywhere.46 In the years 1879–1882, about 3,000 Chi-
nese died every year in the Perak tin mines alone. From the 150,000 beriberi 
cases treated in the hospitals and clinics of the Federated Malay States in the 
1880s and 1890s, and the assumption that only a third of total cases actually 
reached these clinics, a recent analyst has calculated that 100,000 miners 
may have died of beriberi in this period alone.47
analysis
What was the effect of the Chinese mining frontier on the longer-term his-
tory of the region? Unquestionably, these Chinese miners brought capital-
ism, the global economy, and industrial-scale production techniques to 
areas that had previously been largely jungle. They provided some infrastruc-
ture, and survived the most dangerous disease regime before settled condi-
tions were established. Their success made Malaya, Bangka, and West Bor-
neo so productive and important that colonial power followed.
 Reports are more mixed on the political effects. George Windsor Earl, 
like many other advocates of British intervention in the 1860s, regarded as 
a great evil the “unlimited extortion” that the Chinese capitalists, who typi-
cally also controlled the secret societies and hence the labor trade, could 
exercise over the miners. Mary Turnbull, while citing these views, argues 
that “the rapid expansion of the tin trade hastened the disintegration of tra-
ditional authority in the Malay states.”48 On the other hand, Wong Lin Ken 
sees the authority of the fifteenth century Melaka sultanate as having well 
and truly disintegrated by the nineteenth century, to the point where any eco-
nomic surplus local chiefs could extract was devoted to pursuing internecine 
conflicts rather than developing the land.49
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 In comparative terms, what was exceptional about the Chinese mining 
kongsis was their readiness to accept the fragile authority of established 
river chiefs, even including paying them substantial rents, provided their 
essential livelihood was not threatened. Had a male workforce of this scale 
entered the Peninsula under Bugis, Malay, Acehnese, Thai, or European aus-
pices, it would immediately have changed the power balance and threatened 
the position of rulers. What attracted the local river chiefs, indeed, was the 
Chinese reputation for political docility, and for governing their own inter-
nal affairs through kongsi, secret-society, and religious means. When rival 
Chinese secret societies were drawn into Peninsula conflicts, they certainly 
exacerbated them by increasing substantially the scale of operations. How-
ever, the conflicts between the chiefs were already there, and inviting Chi-
nese in was another weapon in the ongoing Malay struggles. In more uni-
fied political environments, as in Siam, Vietnam, or the Dutch sphere, such 
polarization seldom occurred.
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